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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

MELVIN JAMES WORKMAN,
Case No.

Defendant-Appellant.

16922

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, MELVIN

JA..~S

WQPJ(MAN, appeals from a con-

viction of Rape, a Second Degree Felony and Burglary, a Second
Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, MELVIN JAMES WORKMAN, was found guilty
of Rape and Burglary by a jury.
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin.

The trial was heard by the

Appellant was sentenced to serve an

indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years for both offenses to run consecutively at the Utah State
Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON" APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Deana English testified that on the 19th day of
February, 1979, at approximately 1:00 a.m. a man entered her
apartment at 3378 South Fifth East (TR 11,14,15).

She was

awakened when the man put his hand over her mouth, turned her over
on her stomach, put a pillow over her head, and raped her.

She

further testified that he informed her that he had a gun and
instructed her not to scream.

(TR 18).

A brown leather wallet

was found by a police officer who investigated the case. (TR 27).
The prosecutor introduced statements made by appellant which are
tantamount to a confession.

Through direct examination of

Connie Riley, the following testimony was elicited by the prosecutor:

Q:

Tell--use the words he used as best you can
recall. What did [Melvin Workman] say?

A:

I am going to sit here and wait, the cops know-have my wallet. There is nothing you can do,
I raped the girl. There is no need for you to
go looking for my wallet, the cops have it, I
know I left it at her place. (TR 90).

Defense counsel made continuous objections to this line
of questioning and finally moved for a mistrial.

The basis of
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the motion was that the prosecution had knowingly and intentionally
failed to disclose the defendant's incriminating statements made to
Connie Riley in the face of a specific request for that evidence
at the

preli~inary

hearing.

At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel and Officer
Virgil Johnson particiapted in the following colloquy:
[Defense counsel] Q:
Workman make?

What statements did Mr.

A:

That he entered the apartment--

Q:

Who did he make these to?

A:

To Connie Riley. He entered the apartment
and took $80.00 cash out of a wallet that
was located in the front room. And that
he put the wallet underneath a t.v. pillow
in the front room area. And prior to leaving,
dropped his wallet, some way or another.
(Preliminary hearing transcript 79)

Officer Johnson failed to disclose the most incriminating aspect
of the statement--that the appellant raped the woman in the apartment.

A search of the preliminary hearing transcript discloses

that Deputy County Attorney J. Campbell never acted to correct
this false testimony.
Quite apart
volving

from the prosecutorial misconduct in-

the aforementioned false testimony, defense counsel asked

the prosecutor on numerous occasions during the pre-tr.ial phase
of the case whether he had shared with defense counsel all the
information he had on the case.

During the pre-trial

and
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trial stages of the case Deputy County Attorney Lynn Payne
appeared on behalf of the State.

Mr. Payne assured defense

counsel on every such occassion that he had done so.

(TR 137).

Defense counsel made conscious and deliberate strategic
decisions based on the information given to him by Officer
Johnson at the preliminary hearing and the prosecutor during
the pre-trial stage of the case.

Specifically, the appellant

waived his right to a jury trial at the urging of his counsel
(TR 2-4 and TR 139); the appellant refused a plea negotiation
upon the advise of counsel (reference TR 149); and the appellant
presented no rebuttal to the surprise testimony of Connie Riley.
(TR 148-149 and TR 177).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTION'S INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE STATEMENTS ALL~GEDLY MADE BY
APPELLANT DEPRIVED HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL
AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
DENYING HIS MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), this
Court observed that an ancillary purpose of the preliminary
hearing is that it serves as a discovery

device enabling the

defendant to be informed of the nature of the State's case against
him.

In the case at bar, defense counsel availed himself of this
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opportunity and pursued discovery in his case by questioning police
officers concerning any incriminating statements made by the
defendant.

Additionally, defense counsel relied on the verbal

assurances of the Deputy County Attorney assigned to the case
that he (defense counsel) had .all the information regarding the
case. (TR 137).

The combined effect of Officer Johnson's misrep-

resentation and Deputy County Attorney Jerry Campbell's silence
followed by Deputy County Attorney Lynn Payne's continued suppression of material evidence acted to deny the appellant a fair
trial.
The appellant's request at his preliminary hearing for
the disclosure of evidence in the possession of the prosecution
was founded on the State's obligation to provide him with a
fundamentally fair trial.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
7 of the Utah Constitution mandate that defendants
trials.

receive fair

A fair trial embraces the right to expect and demand

truthful responses to questions put to police officers under oath
concerning the existence of inculpatory statements made by the
defendant.

Since the seminal case of Br'ad)i v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83 (1963), courts have repeatedly held that the prosection's
suppression of material evidence violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

-5-
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In Brady v. Maryland, supra, the defendant was convicted (
first degree murder and sentenced to death.

After the conviction,

he learned of an extrajudicial confession made by his accomplice, wt
was later tried and convicted of the same crime, wherein the
latter admitted the actual homicide.

In spite of a request

by defense counsel to examine any statements made by the
accomplice, the prosecution refused to disclose the excuplatory
evidence.

The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Third

Circuit's determination that suppression of the evidence was
error, and concluded that the withholding of the confession was
prejudicial.

The Brady court also held that suppression of

material evidence justifies a new trial "irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."

373 U.S. at 87.

In the case at bar, where a specific request was made
for the evidence, there can be no conclusion other than that the
suppression of the evidence by both Officer Johnson and Deputy
County Attorney Jerry Campbell was done in bad faith.

In Moonev

v. Hoolohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), the undisclosed evidence showed
that the conviction was obtained by the knowing use of perjured
testimony.

In Mooney _the United States Supreme Court made clear

that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation
of known false testimony was incompatible with "rudimentary
demands of justice."

This holding was reaffirmed in Pyle v.

Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
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Regardless of whether Mr. Campbell acted in good faith
or bad faith, the conclusion that the appellant was denied
fundamental fairness is compelling.

In Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264 (1959), the court stated, "the same result obtains
when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows
it to go uncorrected when it appears."
The fact that a different

360 U.S. at 269.

prosecutor failed to correct

the false testimony from the one who tried the case does not alter
the conclusion that the appellant was denied fundamental fairness.
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), defense counsel
discovered

subs~quent

to trial that the Government had

a key witness irrnnunity from prosecutor
Government.

pro~ised

if he testified for the

During trial however, the informant flatly denied

that any such agreement was made.

Despite the Government's

contention that a different prosecution promised immunity from
the one who tried the case, the Supreme Court held that the
suppression of material evidence, regardless of whether it was
done in good or bad faith, required a new trial:
Moreover, whether the nondisclosure was
a result of negligence or design, it is
the responsibility of the prosecutor.
The prosecutor's office is an entity
and as such it is the spokesman for the
government. Id. at 154.
The expansion of criminal discovery to facillitate a
fundamentally fair trial for the defendant is embodied in the
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, notably Rule 16,
States v.

Pas~tial,

In United

606 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1979), a magistrate

entered a standing discovery order which directed the Government
to perm.it the defendant to inspect documents, objects, photographs,
etc., which would be material to the defense or intended for use
by the Government in their case-in-chief. 'Although defense counsel
was permitted to examine the prosecution's file, he never saw a
letter from the defendant to an unindicted co-conspirator which
exposed the defendant's plan to manufacture and distribute
methaqualone.

The Government asserted that the letter was in the

file, and the failure of the defense to review it was the result
of its own negligence.

In spite of the Government's contention

that the letter was in the file, the court ruled that the document should have been produced under Rule 16 (a)(l)(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
The prosecution knew it had the letter and
also knew that as to Pascual it amounted
virtually to a signed plea of guilty ...
Under the order to produce, it should have
made certain that the letter was made
available to the defendants in such a manner
as would have eliminated any plausible
dispute about it.
606 F.2d at 565.
Similarly, in the case at bar the prosecutor at the preliminary
hearing knew that Officer Johnson was concealing the most damaging
statement they attributed to the defendant from him and counsel
in the face of a specific request for the disclosure of the evidence.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Although Pascual is distinguishable from the instant matter because there a magistrate entered a standing discovery order, the
instant matter is nonetheless analagous where the committing
magistrate ordered Officer Johnson to answer defense counsel's
inquiries about any statemnts made by the appellant.
In Pascual, the court noted that failure to comply with
Rule 16(a) was not reversible without a showing of some prejudice.
However, the court pointed out that the prejudice was abundantly
manifest:
It would be hard to make an argument with
any degree of plausibility that the use of
this letter without prior production did
not seriously prejudice the defendants
in exercising their option to plead not
guilty and in their preparation for trial.
In short, it was a written plea of guilty
to the allegations contained in the
indictment.
606 F.2d at 565-566.
Certainly the prejudice is just as

c~early

present in the case at

bar.
It is interesting to ·note that the Fifth Circuit pointed
out that reversal in Pascual was necessary in order to enforce
Rule 16:

A new trial with this nail in the coffin lid,
now fully disclosed, may likely result in
another verdict of guilty. Nevertheless,
the vindiction of Rule 16 and notice to
Plaintiff's in this Circuit that they must
effectively comply with it, leaves no choice
but to reverse these convictions and remand
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for a new trial.
606 F.2d at 566.
Similarly, in the case at bar, reversal is mandated to insure
that the prosecution is not permitted to profit from its own
wrongdoing.
In State v. Hiteshaw, 476 P.2d 935 (Ore. 1970), the
Oregon court refused to countenance the type of prosecutorial,
misconduct which

inheres in the case at bar.

In Hiteshaw,

the court ruled that the defendant was entitled to a new trial
where the prosecutor, in defiance of a court order, failed to
disclose a police report which included a statement attributed
to the defendant:
It seems evident that the prosecution sought
to conceal the most damaging admission they
attributed to defendant from him and counsel
prior to trial, ih_defiance of the court's
order. These tactics were unfair.
560 P.2d t 936.
The ratio decidendi of the Hiteshaw
the same compelling logic in the case at bar.

court applies with
Moreover, the

intentional suppression of the appellant's statements by the
prosecution is all the more egregious in light of the guidelines
set by the American Bar Association's project on standards for
criminal justice.

Section 2.1 of Standards Relating to Discovery

and Procedure Before Trial sets out the prosecutor's obligations
with respect to what must be disclosed to an accused:
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... [T]he prosecuting attorney shall disclose
to defense counsel the following material
and information within his possession or
control:
... [ii] any written or recorded statements
and the substance of an oral statements made
byte accuse ... Empasis upp ie
The commiit!tee c;iescribed the reasons it used in setting
this standard in the accompanying commentary.

With respect to

Section 2.1 the committee stated:
The basis for providing an accused a copy of
his own statements has usually been the notion
of fundamental fairn·ess, coupled with the
absence of any compelling reason to withhold
disclosure, at least in the cale of a statement
during the prosecution's case.
[Emphasis Supplied]
The statements of an .accused obviously are of quint1

essential importance to defense counsel in :the preparation of
his case.

However, in State v. Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880

(1977), the court vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded
the case for an evidentiary

hearing where the failure to disclose

01

concerned the statement of a potential alibi witness requested for
the first time by defense counsel during the trial.

In Brown,

the defendant's attorney learned during trial that a sheriff's

1. Also see the A.B.A Code of Professional Responsibility
Ethical Consideration 7-13: "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice not merely to convict."
-11-
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deputy had taken a statement from a potential alibi witness.
Notwithstanding the inconvenient timing of the defense attorney's
request for disclosure and the failure of the defense attorney
to pursue fo·r.mal discover, the Idaho Supreme court ruled that the

trial judge erred by not granting the defense's request and
ordering

disclosure.

Because defense attorney had specifically

requested the information, the Idaho court pointed out that a
stricter rule was triggered as to the prosecution's duty to
disclose.

Quoting from United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97

(1963), the Brown court stated:
Although there is, of course, no duty to provide
defense counsel with unlimited discovery of
everything known by the prosecutor, if the subject matter of such a request is material, or
indeed if a substantial basis for claiming
materiality exists, it is reasonable to require
the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing
the information or by submitting the problem to
the trial judge. When the prosecutor receives
a specific and relevant request, the failure
to make any response is seldom, if ever,
excusable.
427 U.S. at 106.
560 P.2d at 883-884.
Applying Brown to the instant matter, defense counsel
requested disclosure of material evidence at the preliminary
hearing -

the defendant's statements.

The State's failure to

disclose these statements should not be excused.

As the United

States Supreme Court observed in Napue v. Illinois,
269

360 U.S. 264,

(1959), a conviction must fall "when the State, although not
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soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it
appears."
The Utah Supreme Court has commented that a conviction
obtained after the prosecution's suppression of evidence material
to guilt or innocence is incompatible with the interests of
justice.

In State v. Stewart,

defendant contented that

544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975), the

the errasure of. a tape which recorded a

conversation between the defendant and an informant during a
drug buy amounted to a suppression of evidence.

The court disagreed

but did point out that:
[A] deliberate suppression or destruction of
evidence by those charged with the prosecution,
including police officers, constitutes a denial
of due process if the evidence is materal to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a
criminal case ... Id at 479.
Clearly

the suppression of evidence in the instant

case was

both deliberate and material to the defendant's guilt.
In Codianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 824 (Utah 1979), the
Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a Petition for PostConviction Relief, alleging that evidence was withheld by the
prosecution which would have been favorable to the defense.
Defense counsel, upon learning that exclupatory evidence did exist,
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the defendant's behalf, and
was shortly thereafter handed copies of depositions which would
-13-
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have assisted in the preparation and presentation of the defense.
On the basis of this evidence, and due to the gravity of the
matter, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court for a
hearing to determine whether the disclosure of the evidence
would have produced

a different result.

The court continued:

It is fundamental that the State, in vigorously
enforcing the laws, has a duty not only to
secure appropriate convictions but perh?PS
an even higher duty to see that justice is
done, even if that means disclosing to defense
counsel in a criminal case evidence which is
exculpatory. Id. at 3.
Most recently in State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah
1980), the Utah Supreme Court examined in depth the defendant's
contention that the prosecution illegally suppressed certain
evidence.

The defendant was convicted of attempted criminal

homicide, and claimed that two police reports withheld by the
prosecution would have tended to discredit the victim's ability
to accurately perceive the critical events of the attack, they

were also inconsistent with the reporting officer's testimony.
It was conceded by the appellant that there was no effort made
prior to trial to obtain copies of the reports.

The factor which

the court relied upon most heavily in rejecting the appellant's
contention was that at trial, the appellant had not requested any
of the reports.

The reasons for this ruling were that it would

place too great of a burden on the prosecution to anticipate what
evidence wouldbeuseful to defense counsel, and secondly, defense
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counsel would be able to go to trial, lose, then demand a new
trial based on the prosecutor's failure to divulge exculpatory
evidence.
In the case at bar, defense counsel specifically
requested the disclosure of the statement which Officer Johnson
failed to reveal.

Consequently, the appellant's claim does not

suffer from the flaw which inhered in Jarrell.
United State v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), sets out the
standard to be applied in assessing the appellant's claim of error.
The proper test to be applied in cases where a specific request is mad,
is
ant

whether or not the failure to disclose has denied the def end" ... evidence [which] might have affected the outcome of the

trial."

427 U.S. at 104.

In the instant case, the fact that the

statement amounted to a full confession made

it sufficiently

material to "have affected the outcome of the trial."

Id.

The

failure of the prosecution to disclose the statement when
specifically requested frustrates the interests of justice.
Brady v. Maryland, supra, and its progeny have sought to
insure that the accused avoids an unfair trial:

"Society wins

not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials
are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers
when any accused is treated unfairly."

Id. at 87.

In the instant matter the appellant has been treated
unfairly.

Relying on the veracity of Officer Johnson's sworn
-15-
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testimony, Mr. Van Seiver advised his client to waive his right to
trial by jury.

Because Mr. Van Seiver was surprised at trial

by the confession, he was completely unprepared to discredit
Clearly Mr. Van Sciver's

the witness or rebut her testimony.

trial strategy would have been significantly· different had he
been privileged to the most damaging admission attributed to
the appellant, but intentionally concealed by the prosecution.
For the reasons stated, the appellant respectfully
asks this court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new
trial.
DATED this

2:3_ day of December,

1980.

Res?ecfuffully suBbmitted,

lu (t ffJ) q_ \ ~~,S&l-t
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1

.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR
Attorney for Appella·t~ant
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